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auferlegten Zivilisationsmission entlarvt, 
die als Legitimationsmechanismus der 
Fremdherrschaft diente. Manns Fokus auf 
historiografische Traditionen der verschie-
denen Epochen zeigt hingegen, dass Ge-
schichtsschreibung auch in der vorkoloni-
alen Epoche auf imperialer und regionaler 
Ebene als Werkzeug zur Legitimation von 
Herrschaft diente.
Insbesondere durch den globalgeschicht-
lichen, vernetzten Blickwinkel hat der 
Autor eine alternative Sicht auf die Ge-
schichte Südasiens vorgelegt, mit der sich 
die Auseinandersetzung lohnt.
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One of the three blurbs for this small vol-
ume simply states: “Bates is the undisput-
ed doyen of political scientists working on 
Africa. Here, in one short book, he gives 
us his distilled analysis of a lifetime. Read 
it” – says no less a figure than Paul Collier, 
former World Bank chief economist who 
is now back at the Centre for the Study of 
African Economies at Oxford. The book, 
to leave no doubt, is exactly delivering on 
this promise – but on little more. 
In late-century, Robert Hinrichs Bates, the 
Eaton Professor of the Science of Govern-
ment and Professor of African and Afri-
can American Studies at Harvard (Cam-
bridge), introduces, “things fell apart” 
in Africa – i.e. the number of civil wars 
started to increase. Answers to this puz-
zle, Bates claims, are to be found in the 
theories on the state and the sources of 
political disorder. Himself a political sci-
entist by training, though with consider-
able exposure to anthropology, with a turn 
to political economy later, Bates develops 
his argument on a reading of Max Weber 
and, later, game theory and cross national 
regressions. The argument Bates develops 
explicitly takes on some approaches (which 
some may consider “mainstream”) on the 
alleged role of ethnic diversity in conflict, 
the political significance of resource rich-
ness or the claimed nexus between democ-
ratisation and political instability.
The possibility of political order, Bates ar-
gues, rests on the level of public revenues, 
the rewards from predation, and the rate 
of discount of the “specialist in violence” 
(i.e. Weberian rulers). In the 1960s African 
politics were dominated by forms of elec-
toral clientelism (though Bates doesn’t call 
it this way): bloc votes were exchanged for 
material benefits. Once the voters learned 
“to play the system to their advantages 
they will then extract all the benefits n of-
fer. Thus the incumbent’s dilemma: Pur-
suing power to accumulate wealth, they 
find themselves having to surrender their 
ill-gotten gains to retain political office” 
(p. 40). And with the crisis of clientelism, 
already starting in the 1960s, African rul-
ers started creating authoritarian regimes. 
Hence the political arena begun to shrink, 
political privileges played an ever more 
important role while economic inequal-
ity increased. At the end private benefits, 
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rather than public goods, dominated poli-
tics in what become “control regimes”, in-
terventionist economies, which benefited 
an urban clientele and the president who 
“multiplied the political resources at his 
command” (p. 68). Against this back-
ground the sources for political tensions 
often were local and the seed for conflict 
was sown by the dynamics of agrarian so-
cieties – as illustrated with the case of the 
Kikuyu in the Kenyan Rift Valley or the 
Oromo in the Ethiopian lowlands.
Things started to go wrong when public 
revenues declined in the late 1970s, due to 
a combination of a downfall in commod-
ity incomes and sharp increases in energy 
prices. As a consequence, incomes of pub-
lic employees plummeted, the quality of 
public services declined, levels of corrup-
tion rose and it became more difficult to 
manage regional tensions. In response, to 
Bates narrative continues, African citizens 
as well as external actors, most important-
ly the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, called for political re-
forms. Africa’s political elites became inse-
cure: And “with the loss of public revenues, 
governments became more predatory” (p. 
121). The possible short-terms gains of 
abandoning the role of a guardian by cash-
ing in on the continent’s natural resources 
pushed aside any other considerations.
The book is indeed delivering on Colliers’ 
promise. But this exactly is also the prob-
lem with Bates’ narrative. An old hand in 
US political science on Africa with a uni-
versity career, which stretches over more 
than 40 years, Bates combines some of 
the most attractive, but also some of the 
more problematic traditions of his trade. 
The quest for systematization and rigorous 
modelling has resulted in a lean explana-
tion for what Bates terms “state failure”. 
The argument carries some elegance when 
elite decisions are basically reduced to 
game theory and dominant dynamics are 
described in a very lucid way. However, at 
the same time the argument is also heavily 
flawed by its superficiality. Too often Bates 
is glossing over historic differences. Afri-
can Studies, too, has shown that elites (as 
any other social groups) cannot be reduced 
to rational actors in an arena modelled by 
the assumptions of game theory. The argu-
ment presented on the combination of in-
ternal and external pressure on incumbent 
regimes (which is said to have increased 
their sense of insecurity and willingness to 
take risks) is ahistorical: The cases of in-
ternal pressure quoted – Benin, Zambia 
– are the result of dynamics infolding only 
after external pressure had led to the adop-
tion of structural adjustment programmes, 
they didn’t go hand in hand. But most 
importantly, “state failure” – at least in 
the way described as the core problem of 
this book – itself is too undifferentiated a 
term, is far too ambivalent in its empirical 
evidence and too controversial by way of 
its normative overload, that it makes sense 
analytically. Empirically the pathways Afri-
can regimes have taken since the end of the 
Cold War offer more variation as simply 
“state failure” (and the many other cases 
of “good governance” or whatever the label 
might be) – and the nature of “states” itself 
seems far more complex.
